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The study of evolutionary patterns of cognitive convergence would be greatly helped by a clear 
demarcation of cognition. Cognition is often used as an equivalent of mind, making it difficult to 
pin down empirically or to apply it confidently beyond the human condition. Recent 
developments in embodied cognition and philosophy of biology now suggest an interpretation 
that dissociates cognition from this mental context. Instead it anchors cognition in a broad range 
of biological cases of intelligence, provisionally marked by a basic cognitive toolkit. This 
conception of cognition as an empirically based phenomenon provides a suitable and greatly 
expanded domain for studies of evolutionary convergence. This paper first introduces this wide, 
biologically embodied interpretation of cognition. Second, it discusses examples drawn from 
studies on bacteria, plants and fungi that all provide cases fulfilling the criteria for this wide 
interpretation. Third, the field of early nervous system evolution is used to illustrate how 
biologically embodied cognition raises new fundamental questions for research on animal 




1 Converging on cognition 
When it comes to the study of cognitive convergence, the human mind has long provided the 
central feature of the evolutionary landscape. The controversy between Stephen Jay Gould and 
Simon Conway Morris provides an illustration. Gould has in many works – but most prominently 
in his Wonderful Life (1989) – defended the idea that evolution is radically contingent: If ‘the 
tape of life’ is rerun, even a small change would result in widely diverging outcomes and the 
chance that humans would evolve again in such a rerun is negligible. Powell and Mariscal (2015) 
name this Gould’s Radical Contingency Thesis: “no important and sufficiently specific 
evolutionary outcomes are robustly replicable” (p.12). When applied to the question of cognitive 
convergence, Gould’s message would be not to expect any.  
In his critique of Gould’s radical contingency, Conway Morris (1998, 2003) agrees with 
Gould that historical contingencies are everywhere in evolution, however:  
 
“Put simply, contingency is inevitable, but unremarkable. It need not provoke discussion, 
because it matters not. There are not an unlimited number of ways of doing something. 
For all its exuberance, the forms of life are restricted and channeled.” (1998, p13) 
 
This message can be cast in terms of hill-climbing in a global search space. Only a few options 
within this space provide sound solutions to various design problems (Dennett, 1995), and by 
traveling uphill in the direction of such optima, species will eventually acquire the characteristics 
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of these options, irrespective of their starting position. Conway Morris argues that given the 
tendency of evolution to converge on good solutions, creatures that are very similar to humans 
are actually to be expected once life is underway (2003). For the evolution of cognition, this 
implies that a human-like organization and mind constitute a global attractor on which 
evolutionary trajectories will converge from widely different starting conditions.  
 Powell and Mariscal (2015) stress that Gould’s position cannot be so easily dismissed as 
Conway Morris here suggests, a systematic study of cases of potential cognitive convergence will 
be necessary to decide this issue. In addition, the issue is not exhausted by these two options 
concerning cognitive convergence – either none or one – as logically there might be a multitude 
of possible cases and forms of cognition to converge on. For both reasons, a more detailed view 
of the search space relevant for cognition will be necessary. As the proposers of this special issue 
state: “Any study of cognitive convergence that aims to draw broad lessons about the evolution of 
mind—not only in relation to its replicability, but also about the specific development and 
ecological conditions under which it is possible or even likely to occur—must establish and 
endeavour to explain patterns of cognitive convergence across a wide swath of taxa.”  
This idea is spot on. However, explaining patterns of cognitive convergence across a wide 
swath of taxa implies a meaningful and coherent way to talk about cognition in a much wider 
sense than rejecting or accepting a human-based interpretation of cognition. Up to now, the 
(human) mind forms the central point of reference for talking about cognition even to the point of 
taking the two notions as being equivalent. Classic examples consist of human capacities like 
language, logic, reasoning, learning skills, counting, playing music, and recognizing oneself in a 
mirror. Some other animals may perform some of these feats, but it remains at all times a matter 
of concern whether they truly do as humans do (e.g. De Waal & Ferrari, 2010; Penn, Holyoak & 
Povinelli, 2008).  
This mind-based interpretation provides a very fickle way of demarcating cognition, as 
individual cases may move across this boundary depending on the latest experiments. In addition, 
it does not self-evidently deal with the obvious continuity of the many capacities that humans do 
share with many other organisms, such as perception, memory and action, and that should be 
taken into consideration when dealing with cognitive convergence. Third, it tends to preclude an 
integrated way of referring to the intelligent capacities of organisms coming from a wide swath of 
phyla and kingdoms that are very far from the human paradigm (as discussed in section 3). All in 
all, we just cannot take it for granted that human-style intelligence provides the center of all 
possible forms of intelligence that occur within the biological world. The systematic study of 
evolutionary patterns of cognitive convergence would be greatly helped by a clearer and more 
robust conceptual demarcation of cognition that can be confidently applied to a broad variety of 
cases, including, but not limited to, humans.  
A radical way forward at this point is to explicitly question and disband the paradigmatic 
status given to the (human) mind as the yardstick of both cognition and intelligence. This option 
is supported by work in embodied cognition, which interprets cognitive processes in terms that 
apply to an array of systems that do not exhibit mind in any standard sense. Also, from a 
biological perspective, many organisms exhibit forms of intelligence, even when applying the 
notion of mind to these organisms remains farfetched. In the following, I will develop this idea 
by presenting a new conceptualization of cognition that dissociates cognition from the mind: 
Cognition will be conceptualized as referring to an empirical domain centered on the various 
ways in which organisms deal with their environment in ways that systematically further their 




The opposition between the two interpretations is sketched in Figure 1, which shows how 
human intelligence can be placed in two different conceptual contexts. One consists of mind, a 
classic concept that is not tied to biology but applies to entities ranging from humans to angels, 
ghosts, artificial minds and God. This conception tends to exclude, or at the very least to 
question, many biological cases that exhibit various forms of intelligence. The second context 
consists of BEC. Here, human intelligence is placed within a wider biological domain, 





Figure 1 Human intelligence is here positioned in two different conceptual contexts that can be dissociated from one 
another. BEC refers to a broad domain of biological cases of intelligence as designated by embodied approaches to 
cognition. Mind refers here to the intuitively ascribed common sense notion of an abstract entity or set of processes 
that is only loosely (or not at all) tied to physical systems. 
 
 
The central idea here is that one can set the concepts related to mind aside, while 
developing an independent parallel account of cognition that builds on the many biological cases 
of intelligence. This parallel domain can accommodate forms of intelligence that are very 
different from human and animal examples, allowing not only a continuum of cases along a 
single axis of more to less complex, but also opening a way to think about radically different 
forms of intelligence. BEC provides a congenial conceptual context for interpreting various forms 
of cognitive convergence and divergence. I will also argue that BEC can catalyze new research 
questions that move beyond the conceptual options allowed within a mind-based conceptual 
framework. In all this, human intelligence becomes one, although special, case among many 
others. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the background of the conceptual 
proposal for a biologically embodied interpretation of cognition and develops this proposal in 
some more detail. Section 3 discusses how BEC extends the cognitive domain as it applies to a 
broad range of lifeforms, including bacteria, plants, fungi, and animals. This emerging 
interdisciplinary research domain, in turn, lends plausibility to the biologically embodied 
interpretation of cognition proposed here. Section 4 illustrates how BEC invites new and 
fundamental conceptual questions concerning cognition using the evolution of early nervous 







2 From mind to biologically embodied cognition 
Cognitive science evolved as an amalgam of several scientific enterprises concerned with 
studying the human mind (Gardner, 1985). The concept of mind as an inner domain of thought 
and consciousness derives from long-standing philosophical traditions such as Cartesianism and 
British Empiricism. Its connection with dualism made it an increasingly problematical notion 
during the twentieth century until cognitive science came into existence with its promise to keep 
the mind while discarding the dualism. The notion of cognition became subsequently a useful 
way to signal this more respectable view of the mind, while also acquiring a face of its own. 
 In its original usage, cognition came to refer to complex forms of internal information 
processing. Information processing provided a way to explain various forms of problem solving 
and decision making, with examples like playing chess, reasoning and the interpretation of visual 
scenes being prominent. The central idea here was that computational information processing 
provided an internal mechanism that could manipulate representations, which in turn enabled 
reasoning, decision making and planning. Here is Neisser’s well-known description: 
 
The term ‘cognition’ refers to all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, 
reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned with these processes even 
when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images and hallucinations. 
(Neisser, 1967, p.4) 
 
This cognitive science interpretation was taken up widely and for example also used by 
Shettleworth in her classic textbook of comparative psychology where she applies it to animals in 
general: 
 
Cognition refers to the mechanisms by which animals acquire, process, store, and act on 
information about the environment. These include perception, learning, memory, and 




Interestingly, if cognition is literally held to be equivalent to internal information processing as 
stated here, any computer would be a cognitive system. Most researchers and philosophers active 
within cognitive science are unwilling to accept this conclusion and additional requirements are 
standardly used to bar this possibility. Shettleworth explicitly limits her definition to animals, for 
example. However, as all animals exhibit forms of perception, learning and so on, this restriction 
may be considered insufficient. After all, a major question within cognitive ethology and 
comparative psychology concerns whether certain animals ‘really’ have cognitive features that 
include, for example, a self-concept or intentions (e.g. Penn, Holyoak & Povinelli, 2008; Hurley 
& Nudds, 2005; Tomasello, Call & Hare, 2003). The presence of high-level mental functions 
remains a central requirement for what most researchers in cognitive science are willing to call 
cognition. Cognition remains firmly tied to mind here. 
 In addition to this inner information processing interpretation, other views have sprung up 
of which two are central here: embodied approaches within cognitive science and a biological 
interpretation from philosophy of biology. Embodied approaches to cognition have for many 
years now criticized the idea of cognition as inner information processing. Rodney Brooks’ work 
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 The same text can be found in the second edition from 2010. 
5 
 
in robotics in the late eighties was an early example. He stressed the central role of ongoing 
bodily interactions with an environment as a way to minimize the need for inner information 
processing and move the field of robotics forward (Brooks, 1999). In addition, authors like Van 
Gelder (1995), Beer (2003) and Chemero (2009) presented the mathematical framework of 
dynamical systems as a new way to describe and understand the ongoing perception-action 
relations between agents and their environments. Rather than being peripheral to intelligence, 




In this embodied perspective, minimal forms of cognition are present in complex agent-
environment interactions rather than inner information processing (Beer, 2003). Problem solving 
itself often depends on the manipulation of an environment, while the sensorimotor-tasks that 
animals routinely accomplish are actually highly complex – just try to make a robot that does the 
same – rather than basic behavioral responses. More complex inner information processing, such 
as involved in various forms of memory, learning and planning, fits in this picture as a way to 
extend the behavioral capacities of basic embodied agents. Still, the latter would be sufficient to 
talk about a form of cognition: the presence of perception-action relations forms the key feature 
for basic forms of cognition here.
3
 
 Biological readings of cognition depart from the two previous views in an important way. 
Within cognitive science, cognition is treated at an abstract functional level where biological 
brains and bodies, and computers and robots are both considered as perfectly legitimate realizers 
of cognitive phenomena. Conceptually, neither the mind nor its derivative cognition is 
necessarily connected to biology. As philosopher Andy Clark (2005) once phrased it: thinking 
otherwise would be succumbing to “mere bio-chauvinistic prejudices”. In contrast, biological 
readings take a living biological organization as a precondition for cognition, thus making an 
important additional claim.  
Such biological interpretations come in various forms. One highly influential, though 
controversial, approach goes back to the work of Maturana and Varela (1980) who stated that 
“living systems are cognitive systems” because of the complex ways in which self-maintenance 
depends on successful interactions with an environment. Another important influence here is the 
philosophical work of Godfrey-Smith (1996) and his idea that cognition “shades off” into other 
biological functions without any clear boundary between the two. More recently, Lyon (2006) 
proposed a biogenic approach to the study of cognition that starts from general biological 
principles rather than from human-based criteria, which she calls an anthropogenic approach. In 
all these cases, cognition is related to the various complex ways in which organisms interact with 
their environment to maintain themselves and to reproduce. 
 Biological and embodied approaches to cognition are suitable companions. Embodied 
cognition provides a conceptual understanding intelligence that starts with the interaction 
between an agent and its environment, highlighting the intricacies of sensorimotor relations and 
the ways in which higher-level forms of cognition derive from and lean on perception-action 
relations: Cognition is here a much broader phenomenon than internal, human thought and self-
evidently applies to most organisms. Biological approaches add to this embodied conceptual 
                                                          
2
 The field has diversified a lot since these early developments. Most of these developments are not directly relevant, 
but for good overviews see Calvo and Gomilla (2008), Pfeifer and Bongard (2006) and in particular Barret (2011) 
who discusses the field as a comparative psychologist and behavioral biologist.  
3
 An extensive discussion on defining cognition has been triggered by the claims made for an environmentally 
extended view on the mind (e.g. Clark, 2008). The call for a definite ‘mark of the cognitive’ has become prominent 
here, but this debate is too extensive to discuss here.  
6 
 
framework in many ways. Foremost, they provide a huge domain of potential cases to which this 
framework applies and where thinking in terms of embodied cognition will be helpful. Consider a 
crab that negotiates its environment, searching food and avoiding predators. Doing this, the crab 
relies on many features – perceiving, moving, judging – that are definitely within the cognitive 
domain for an eye attuned to embodied cognition. In addition, these biological cases with their 
wealth of detail, their variations between both species and individuals, and their complexity 
provide a perfect empirical domain for embodied cognition to sink its teeth into.  
At this point, I propose to combine embodied and biological interpretations of cognition 
even more intimately and turn them into a single view. Here biology provides the empirical 
domain where an embodied conceptualization of cognition applies and can be further developed 
in ways that enhance our understanding of this domain. Most importantly, in this conceptual 
proposal cognition is no longer a notion that acquires its meaning from its connection to mental 
concepts or what we now consider as common sense. Cognition is cast as an empirical concept 
the interpretation of which will change on the basis of what science brings us. The notion will 
become similar to other common concepts that acquired a specific technical interpretation in 
biology such as species, organisms or plants, all of which have been reinterpreted and acquired 
new meanings on the basis of biological research. I refer to this proposed interpretation as 
biologically embodied cognition (BEC). 
This proposal has various positive features. First, this proposal explicitly accepts and 
addresses the wide range of possible cases the living world provides when it comes to cognition 
and that deserve attention in a systematic way. Second, it allows us to deal with cognitive 
phenomena independent from the human case, suggesting instead the possibility of a broad 
variety of cognitive phenomena, as well as the option of a continuum from relatively simple to 
much more complex forms of cognition. Third, in this way BEC provides a suitable conceptual 
framework for the study of cognitive convergence across many and widely separated taxa. 
Fourth, as the proposal includes humans it will provide a wider context for understanding the 
basic organization and operation of human cognition and brain processes, most of which we share 
with other mammals. Fifth and final, this proposal allows a lot of conceptual and scientific 
freedom in rethinking what cognition is and how it can be best explained, given the empirical 
findings.  
The last point may also be read as a criticism as the proposal allows the study of cognition 
to move away from existing views on cognition that keep it as an equivalent of mind. Is there a 
guarantee that the result will provide a suitable account of our own minds? The answer here must 
be radical: there is no such guarantee and there shouldn’t be one. Providing an account of mind – 
as presently conceived at least – is not a concern for this proposal. As shown in Figure 1, this 
proposal dissociates the study of cognition from the study of mind: the study of cognition – now 
conceptualized as intelligent phenomena as they occur in living systems – should be conducted 
on its own accord and develop the necessary concepts and research strategies to further this aim. 
While one may question whether the crab mentioned above has a mind, it does definitely 
perceive, act, and judge in some form, all of which are definite targets for a biologically 
embodied cognitive science. Whether or not the notion of mind applies to such cases is not an 
issue that will be addressed within this scientific project.  
 While the disconnection from the mind may sound radical within the context of current 
cognitive science, it actually fits a lot of long-standing and ongoing research on nonhuman 
intelligence where the notion of mind plays hardly any role. For example, in her textbook 
Shettleworth discusses the connections between behavior and cognition in a way that easily fits 
within BEC. In the next section, more examples will be given of research that addresses the 
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domain just sketched. The present proposal aims to articulate and integrate these often diverse 
research efforts by providing them explicitly with a common label that highlights the relevance of 
this research for understanding intelligent phenomena and that provides a common ground that 
includes all these cases, including the human one.  
Some readers may wonder why the domain targeted by BEC should be called cognition – 
even if used as a technical term. Why not use a different technical term that may cause less 
confusion? I must stress that a different word could be used, although it is unclear which one. 
Using the word cognition for the present proposal is just very fitting: Embodied and biological 
approaches to cognition have shown that a lot of human cognition consists of processes that are 
present in many other lifeforms, even when our common language is rife with the conceptual 
distinction between mind and mere matter. To stress the need for a clear scientific approach of 
this common ground, it is a sensible strategy to challenge the standard – mind-related – usage of 
cognition and to acknowledge the relevance and importance of many organisms with respect to 
phenomena that we willingly call cognitive in humans. Using the word cognition beyond its 
current comfort zone will reinforce this message. 
Cutting cognition loose from the conceptual context provided by the mind runs the risk of 
leaving this new interpretation in a conceptual limbo where it becomes unclear what the notion 
means or refers to. Two considerations should lay this worry to rest. First, by cutting the 
connection cognition does not suddenly lose its current meaning. Compare it to cutting the rope 
between two different ships that were tied together. Initially their positions will not be too 
different, even when it becomes possible to move in different directions. In addition, using 
current knowledge and considerations it will be possible to formulate a preliminary and 
modifiable list of features for what we take BEC to be. Lyon (2015) provides an example in the 
form of ‘a basic cognitive toolkit’ that gives an indication how such a list could look like. 
 
 Sensing/Perception The capacity to sense and recognize (re-cognize) existentially salient 
features of the surrounding milieu.  
 Valence The capacity of an organism to assign a value to the summary of information 
about its surroundings at a given moment, relative to its own current state.  
 Behavior The capacity of an organism to adapt via changing its spatial, structural or 
functional relation to its external or internal milieu.  
 Memory The capacity to retain information about the immediate (and possibly distant) 
past, and to calibrate the sensorium to take account of this information, for example, via 
signal amplification.  
 Learning The capacity to adapt behavior according to past experience, enabling faster 
response time.  
 Anticipation The capacity to predict what is likely to happen next based on an early 
stimulus.  
 Signal integration (decision making) The capacity to combine information from 
multiple sources, because all organisms appear to sense more than one thing, and some 
bacterial species are equipped to sense dozens of different states of affairs.  
 Communication The capacity to interact profitably with conspecifics, including initiating 
collective action, which may or may not include an explicit method of differentiating ’us’ 




A list such as this one must be considered preliminary and open to revision on the basis of what is 
discovered in the living world. For now they will suffice to guide research into the right direction.  
 
 
3 The phylogenetic spread of biologically embodied cognition 
How does this proposal for BEC impact on the study of cognitive phenomena? In this section and 
the next one, I will discuss two different ways in which thinking along the lines of this proposal 
links up with empirical developments. In the next section, I will illustrate the proposal’s potential 
for conceptual innovation by discussing with the example of early nervous systems. In this 
section, I will sketch how BEC dovetails with ongoing empirical work that renders such 
cognition extremely wide-spread or even universal within the living world. The concept of BEC 
highlights the many ways in which organisms organize their interactions with their environment, 
using the capacities named in Lyon’s toolbox and possibly others. As successfully interacting 
with its environment is an essential requirement for any organism, BEC can be expected to be 
very widespread. Here, I will discuss research on a broad variety of organisms in order to assess 
the plausibility of this implication. 
Animals are the obvious group of organism that comes to mind when thinking about 
cognition. Given their complex multicellular bodies, any animal sensing, moving and judging can 
be considered a cognitive system. While there are enormous differences in complexity and 
organization between bonobo’s and pill bugs, the bottom line is that even a humble pill bug has a 
complex sensorimotor system and an array of normative constraints to respect in order to stay 
alive and reproduce. No animal is a mechanical stimulus-response machine, unless it is 
manipulated to behave like one. Once one starts looking with the eyes of a roboticist, all ‘simple’ 
sensing and behavioral features show up as major evolutionary accomplishments (Pfeifer & 
Bongard, 2006; Keijzer, 2001).  
 Bacteria provide much more radical and exotic examples of intelligence, ranging from a 
wide array of cellular adaptations to environmental circumstances, tracking environmental 
features, and complex social interactions (Shapiro, 1998; Ben Jacob, Becker, Shapiro & Levine, 
2004; Westerhof et al., 2014; Lyon, 2015). The case of chemotaxis in Escherichia coli 
(Koshland, 1980) is maybe most often used as an example for the psychological relevance of 
bacteria (Pittinger & Dent, 1988; Van Duijn, Keijzer & Franken, 2006). The bacterium can detect 
a chemical gradient by comparing the amount of a substance at two points in time, by using a 
two-component signal transduction system that operates as a short-term memory enabling the 
bacterium to coordinate its behavior with respect to the gradient. Other examples are the way in 
which Pseudomonas aeruginosa switches between two iron acquisition processes in a way that 
optimizes cost-benefit ratios or how Bacillus subtilis come to the decision transform into a state 
where it is able to take up DNA (both discussed in Westerhof et al., 2014). Galperin (2005) 
provides a more systematic approach to bacterial cognition by initiating a quantitative genomic 
approach to assess the number of bacterial signal transduction proteins available in different 
prokaryote organisms. He argues that the number of encoded signal transducers can be used as a 
measure of the organism’s bacterial IQ: its ability to adapt to diverse conditions, while it usually 
correlates with the phylogenetic position of the organism, its lifestyle, and typical environmental 
challenges it encounters (ibid.). All in all, there is a lot of research related to the ways in which 
bacteria deal with their environment in intelligent ways, and according to the biologically 




 A similar story can be told for plants. Plant scientists have found many cases of intelligent 
behavior in plants and they are actively promoting the idea that we should see plants as intelligent 
organisms (e.g Baluška , Mancuso & Volkman, 2006; Trewavas, 2005; Mancuso & Viola, 2015; 
Van Loon, 2016) and some argue that various characteristics of nervous systems are present in 
plants (Baluška, 2010). Van Loon provides a succinct overview of what plants do: 
  
They are able to perceive the progress of the seasons, as well as the presence of 
neighboring plants that may outgrow them, and they adjust their growth rate and 
morphology accordingly. Plants can ‘smell’ the volatile fragrances that are produced by 
other plants of the same or different species in response to, for example, insect attack, as 
well as gaseous compounds produced by root-colonizing micro-organisms in the soil, and 
thereupon mobilize appropriate defenses to withstand such potential invaders. Plants can 
‘taste’ which nutrients are present in the soil and react with the development of more or 
fewer lateral roots. (2016, p.286, references in the original not included) 
 
Plants easily fulfil the requirements for BEC (Calvo & Keijzer, 2011). 
 For fungi, there is less of an outspoken group of mycologists arguing systematically that 
fungi are intelligent as is the case for bacteria and plants, the exception being work on the 
collective behavior of slime molds (giant unicellular amoebas rather than a fungus) and some 
fungi. However, when one looks at the literature with this question in mind, many cases can be 
found that put fungi on a par with the other groups. The tips of fungal hyphae (tubular filaments 
that are the basic growth form of a fungus) are capable of invading substrates, show directional 
growth that is sensitive to various environmental circumstances and are capable of signaling from 
the tip, which receives the earliest information about ambient conditions to the nucleus that 
controls development (Etxebeste & Espeso, 2016). The interactions of symbiotic fungi with the 
roots of plants can provide a huge benefit to both, but this depends on elaborate signaling 
between fungi and plants, where the plant allows the fungus to grow specialized organs inside 
appropriate plant cells in a way that is highly sensitive to the specific plant structures they invade 
(Parniske, 2008). The growth structure of fungal mycelia (the fungal network constituted by the 
hyphae) is very complex, involving sophisticated ways of sensing, decision making, intercellular 
communication systems, and which is tailored to forage for scarce resources and distribute them 
across the mycelium (Heaton et al., 2012; Ugalde & Belén Rodriquez-Urra, 2014). Such fungal 
mycelia are also capable of traversing labyrinths in an efficient way (Hanson et al., 2006; Held, 
Edwards & Nicolau, 2009). In this way they may very well perform similar to the strategies used 
by slime molds (Reid et al., 2016; Reid & Latty, 2016). Finally, various fungi-species are 
carnivorous. They catch and eat nematodes in ways that are more sophisticated than any 
carnivorous plant. These fungi use adhesive knobs and nets, or constricting rings that trap 
nematodes like rabbits in a snare. Such rings are grown when the fungus detects nematode 
pheromones (Barron, 1977; Hsueh et al., 2013). In some cases, they develop active adhesive 
zoospores that move about, functioning like self-moving sticky mines hunting for nematodes 
(Barron, 1977). Once the nematode is trapped, or contact made, thread-like hyphae invade the 
worm and turn the cytoplasm of the worm into fungus. Even when the mycologists do not seem 
to have advocates explicitly arguing for the intelligent characteristics of fungi, given the 
capacities of fungi as just discussed, they should be treated as a group that exhibits (wide) 
cognition.  
To conclude, various forms of intelligence that fit the proposal for BEC are very 
widespread and biologists are beginning to appreciate these findings as a cohering set of 
10 
 
phenomena that can be grouped and studied together (Calvo & Baluška, 2015). This is no 
coincidence as the proposal was formulated with these findings in mind, as well as the perceived 
need to find a way to refer to these varied cases in a more systematic way, and the desideratum to 
position human intelligence in its natural context. Many biologists are reluctant to talk about 
intelligence, leave alone cognition in nonhuman organisms. They work with scare quotes when 
using psychological terms outside the human range, avoid any hints of anthropomorphism, and 
invoke Morgan’s canon to counter undue psychological interpretations. A wide, biologically 
embodied reading of cognition is cut free from the mental domain and explicitly targets 
biological cases that exhibit features like sensing, behaving, valuing, memorizing, learning and so 
on. Very few creatures can do without such skills. As the kind of studies discussed are only now 
starting up in a more systematic way, it is to be expected that this domain will expand rapidly in 
the near future, bringing together many new findings and connections between these varied cases. 
Such developments will have major implications for the study of cognitive convergence.  
 
 
4 Biologically embodied cognition’s take on early nervous systems 
Accepting the proposal for BEC implies that phenomena that we can scientifically designate as 
cognitive are very widespread and basically universal within life. In addition, BEC invites 
scientific thinking on problems that have so far escaped attention by mind-oriented 
interpretations of cognition. As an example, I will discuss ongoing conceptual and empirical 
work on nervous systems that targets the problem how animal multicellularity – the foundation of 
animal cognition – came about.  
First, BEC encourages one to look at a broader picture than animals alone. As Maureen 
O’Malley (2014) stresses, life is at heart microbial, while multicellular macrobes such as animals, 
plants and fungi are the exception. Animals do not constitute a prototypical ‘natural’ form of life 
that will self-evidently evolve. They are not basic lifeforms but extremely advanced multicellular 
organisms that evolved rather late. For a very long time, microbial life existed on Earth without 
any animals and, as far as we know, life could have gone on perfectly well without them until this 
very day. The presence of animals on Earth is therefore not a starting point but a problem: How 
did such often horrendously complex multicellular organizations first evolve and what role did 
nervous systems play?  
 Modern-style animals with “complex, active bodies (CABs)” (Trestman, 2013) have been 
around roughly since the Cambrian, starting 542 million years ago (Valentine, 2004). CABs are 
defined as having articulated and differentiated appendages; having many degrees of freedom of 
controlled motion; distal senses (e.g., ‘‘true’’ eyes); anatomical capability for active, distal-sense-
guided mobility (e.g. fins or legs); and anatomical capability for active object manipulation (e.g. 
a mouth, hands or tentacles). Coordinating CABs requires a nervous system, and the origin of 
nervous systems must therefore be sought in the Precambrian (Budd, 2015; Erwin et al., 2011; 
Wray, 2015). At present, there is a lot of tentative knowledge but not yet a clear picture as to 
when, why or even how many times nervous systems evolved.
4
 
 CABs require nervous systems to control the animal’s interaction with its environment, 
but this is not the only function of nervous systems, nor is it self-evidently true that this was their 
central function at very early stages of nervous system evolution (Keijzer, Van Duijn & Lyon, 
                                                          
4
 For recent reviews of the early evolution of nervous systems see Bucher and Anderson (2015) and Strausfeld and 




2013). To systemize thinking about early nervous system evolution, Jékely, Keijzer and Godfrey-
Smith (2015) formulated a conceptual option space that sketches two explanatory models and 
distinguishes three different functions for nervous systems – control of behavior, of physiology, 
and of development. The two models are input-output (IO) models and internal coordination (IC) 
models. The models are compatible but emphasize different control tasks for early – and modern 
– nervous systems.  
IO models fit classic information processing, most notably by stressing the role of 
nervous systems in dealing with sensory information, processing it, and producing some form of 
motor output. Such models easily fit CAB-level animal organizations, as well as the standard 
interpretation of nervous systems as information processing devices (Shettleworth, 1998; 
Greenspan, 2007; Keijzer, Van Duijn & Lyon, 2013). IO models apply more widely though, and 
Jékely et al. provide examples of IO-based regulation in animal development and physiology as 
well. 
IC models are less known and focus on the various internal coordination problems that 
arise when many cells have to work together to act – in the animal case – as an integrated 
multicellular unit (Jékely et al., 2015). When life – and BEC – is at heart microbial, the 
multicellular animal organization cannot be taken as a basic starting point. An account is required 
that explains how the constituting cells came to cooperate in the specific ways that are typical for 
the animal organization (Arnellos & Moreno, 2016). Nervous system can be presumed to play a 
central role in generating the multicellular unity of animals and IC models address the question 
how nervous systems contribute to internal coordination. Chris Pantin (1956) provided an early 
IC model when he argued that early nervous systems were essential to organize and coordinate 
muscle contractions involving a large number of contractile cells. Keijzer et al. (2013) provide a 
modern version of this idea.  
As nervous systems are deeply involved in cognition, both when it is interpreted as mind 
and as BEC, the presence of both IO and IC features raise important conceptual questions. Given 
that nervous systems are central to controlling activity both within and outside the body and that 
both functions involve complex forms of information processing (Jékely et al., 2015), the 
question must be asked how these functions are related. It is basic biological knowledge that 
physiology and sensorimotor activity are connected in many and intricate ways. This suggests 
that the two functions may be better taken together, and that we should ask whether it remains 
useful to exclude physiological control from the cognitive domain. When we follow common 
sense, this suggestion may seem absurd: Physiology and sensorimotor activity are very different, 
only the latter being related to cognitive functions. From the perspective of BEC, it is an open 
issue where to draw such demarcations as they must depend on what we encounter in nature. As 
the history of science testifies, being in line with common sense is hardly a way to move science 
and understanding forward. Thus, one general conceptual merit of BEC is the way in which this 
interpretation challenges us to be more open to changes in our interpretations of intelligence in 
the light of new findings and ideas. 
Another example from the same context where BEC encourages thinking in new 
directions consists of animal sensing and the role played by nervous systems here (Keijzer, 
2015). Sensing itself is present everywhere in the biological domain: Each individual cell can 
monitor its environment in often complex ways. Multicellular sensing as achieved by animals is a 
different ballgame though. Animal senses tend to consist of extended sensor arrays made up from 
many individual receptors in a spatial arrangement – for example the skin or retina – allowing 
animals to perceive macroscopic, spatially extended patterns of pressure and light, and to 
integrate these patterns into the higher-level perception of surfaces and objects. The important 
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question here is: how do such huge collections of cells come to act together to constitute unified 
sensory devices, as well as integrated nervous system that controls the animal’s behavior? 
Our current best answer, information processing, remains vague on issues relating to how 
such an extremely complex multicellular organization maintains its coherence over time, 
allowing it to function. When it comes to internal coordination, our understanding of nervous 
systems remains limited (Anderson, 2015; Bell, 1999; Bullock et al., 2005; Parker, 2010; Raichle, 
2010; Uttal, 2011; Yuste, 2015).  
Focusing on the origins of nervous systems provides a route towards understanding the 
operation of nervous systems that targets internal coordination problems more directly. For 
example, IC models allow a different approach to animal sensing that uses an animal body’s 
movements produced by muscle contractions as a means to detect environmental structure at the 
scale of the animal’s body (Keijzer, 2015; Keijzer & Arnellos, 2017).5 The animal body itself 
becomes a multicellular effector and sensing device in one. Early nervous systems may not have 
constituted an input-output device but a controller of spatially organized activity enabling moving 
and sensing at the same time. While this particular proposal remains very preliminary, it 
illustrates how thinking in terms of BEC suggests new questions and directions for research that 
are easily overlooked otherwise.  
 
 
5 Converging on cognitive convergence? 
BEC constitutes a new interdisciplinary domain that targets many different lifeforms and greatly 
extends the domain that is relevant for cognitive convergence. At this stage it is impossible to 
predict in any detail how wider interpretation of cognition would impact on the study of cognitive 
convergence. Here, I will discuss some general implications that seem to be relevant for further 
consideration. 
 
 The human mind should not to be taken as the yardstick for cognitive phenomena. There 
are too many phenomena that do not involve mind in its traditional sense while they fit 
plausible criteria for intelligence.  
 Cognition turns out to be a universal feature of life that can be expected to have diverged 
into a wide array of forms and levels of complexity rather than a single continuum from 
simple to complex. It seems very unlikely that there is a global point of cognitive 
convergence as suggested by Conway Morris. 
 Cognitive convergence can be assumed to take place (or not) in more specific, restricted 
areas within the general cognitive domain where, for example, the study of cognitive 
convergence on human-like characteristics can remain perfectly valid. 
 The study of cognitive convergence becomes wider: BEC involves a huge domain of 
unicellular organisms where specific life-styles may evolve that provide important targets 
for convergence studies. At this level, many or even most potential cases of convergence 
must be presumed to take place at the levels of molecular and cellular organization. For 
example, the notion of a bacterial IQ (Galperin, 2005), or derivatives thereof, may be used 
as an indicator of cognitive convergence initiated by the need to deal with niches that 
require a complex life style. In addition, it will be an interesting issue whether all features 
                                                          
5
 The basic idea derives from sensorimotor theories in embodied cognition where sensing is based on systematic 
sensory changes brought about by self-initiated motility (O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Pfeifer, Iida & Lungarella, 2014). 
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of Lyon’s cognitive toolkit, or of its updates, will be equally wide-spread or whether there 
are systematic convergences on particular combinations. 
 There is a major organizational shift involved in the transition to multicellular organisms, 
which will have many repercussions for cognitive convergence. For example, the number 
of independent transitions to multicellularity is presently set at around 25 (O’Malley, 
Simpson & Roger, 2013), while the lineages with complex multicellular organizations 
remain restricted to three: fungi, animals and plants. The small number of such transitions 
– even 25 is not a large number – suggests that the route to multicellularity may be highly 
contingent and could even constitute a bottleneck for the evolution of macroscopic forms 
of cognition.  
 For the three lineages that did make the transition to complex multicellularity, new 
macroscopic forms of BEC arose, each with their own options for evolutionary 
divergence and convergence.  
 As discussed for the animal case, a differentiated multicellular organization requires 
complex forms of internal coordination that we might come to consider as a part of BEC. 
 
This short list is just a very tentative indication of possible options for research on cognitive 
convergence, given BEC. In all these case, there are new options – and challenges – for 
articulating possible instances of cognitive convergence that are not constrained by common 
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